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AbstrACt
Introduction Aid effectiveness and improving its impact 
is a central policy matter for donors and international 
organisations. Pooled funding is a mechanism, whereby 
donors provide financial contributions towards a common 
set of broad objectives by channelling finance through 
one instrument. The results of pooled funds as an aid 
mechanism are mixed, and there is limited data on 
both methodology for, and results of, assessment of 
effectiveness of pooled funding.
Methods This study adapted a conceptual framework 
incorporating the Paris Principles of Aid Effectiveness 
and qualitative methods to assess the performance 
of the Health Transition Fund (HTF) Zimbabwe. 30 key 
informant interviews, and 20 focus group discussions were 
conducted with informants drawn from village to national 
level. Descriptive secondary data analysis of Demographic 
Health Surveys, Health Management Information Systems 
(HMIS) and policy reports complemented the study.
results The HTF combined the most optimal option to 
channel external aid to the health sector in Zimbabwe 
during a period of socioeconomic and political crisis. 
It produced results quickly and at scale and enhanced 
coordination and ownership at the national and 
subnational level. Flexibility in using the funds was 
a strong feature of the HTF. However, the initiative 
compromised on the investment in local capacity and 
systems, since the primary focus was on restoring 
essential services within a nearly collapsed healthcare 
system, rather than building long-term capacity. Significant 
changes in maternal and newborn health outcomes were 
observed during the HTF implementation in Zimbabwe.
Conclusion A framework which can be used to 
assess pooled funds was adapted and applied. Future 
assessments could use this or another framework to 
provide new evidence regarding effectiveness of pool 
donor funds although the frameworks should be properly 
tested and adapted in different contexts.
IntroduCtIon
Improving the impact of aid, particularly 
in fragile and conflict affected states, has 
become a central policy matter for donors and 
international organisations.1 The theme of 
aid effectiveness emerged in the global devel-
opment agenda in the early 2000, becoming 
central to the achievement of Millennium 
Development Goals and culminated in the 
Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in 
2005, which set the key principles of owner-
ship, alignment, harmonisation, managing 
for results and mutual accountability as 
the pillars of effective and transparent aid 
processes.2 In 2008, the Accra Agenda for 
Action introduced the additional concepts of 
predictability of aid, conditionality and use of 
country systems.3 
In 2011, the New Deal for Engagement in 
Fragile States emphasised key principles of 
aid for fragile states, identifying factors such 
as mutual trust, transparency, risk sharing, use 
of country systems, strengthening of national 
capacity and predictability of aid as additional 
strengths and limitations of this study
 ► The study has a strong potential for influencing 
practice, since it presents a solid benchmark to 
evaluate in future the capacity of other pooled funds 
implemented in the health sector.
 ► This is the first study which used a conceptual 
framework to assess performance and effectiveness 
of a pooled fund in Zimbabwe.
 ► There is little in the existing peer-reviewed litera-
ture analysing the effects of multi-donor trust funds 
which makes it difficult to compare our findings with 
earlier studies.
 ► There is no universally agreed or recommended 
framework to assess the pooled funds in place. We 
adapted Coppin’s (2012) framework which will re-
quire fine tuning before wider use.
 ► Transforming this broad and multidimensional Paris 
Principles into quantifiable indicators do not allow 
for a robust assessment. However, we have used 
qualitative methods to capture key principles of aid 
effectiveness in depth.
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principles necessary for effective aid in countries facing 
or emerging from crises.
The principles set by the Paris Declaration and the 
subsequent above-referred statements have triggered 
important dynamics in the flows of aid. ‘Multi–bi’ aid 
mechanisms, that is, a combination of bilateral and multi-
lateral aid, have progressively flourished and have found 
their most typical instrument in pooled funds.4
Pooled funding mechanisms are to be understood as 
‘arrangements where donors provide financial contri-
butions towards a common set of broad objectives, and 
where allocations for specific activities are decided by a 
joint governing mechanism’.5 A typical pooled funding 
mechanism involves an administrative agent.5 Hence, 
pooled funding is a financing mechanism which aims to 
harmonise aid flows and reduce the transaction costs of 
aid for recipients by channelling finance from multiple 
donors through one instrument.6 It is known as a multi-
donor trust fund, a pooled fund or a basket fund.6 In this 
paper, we will use the term ‘pooled fund’.
Since 2005, the use of pooled funds by donors has 
progressively increased, reaching nearly 20% of the 
total allocation of aid funding from the OECD Develop-
ment Assistance Committee countries in 2012.4 Concur-
rently, Arregoces et al document that basket funding for 
maternal, newborn and child health (MNCH) consis-
tently grew in terms of the overall official development 
assistance (ODA) support for MNCH reaching 6% of it 
in 2009, and then declined, accounting for only 1.4% of 
the ODA to MNCH in 2012.7 Such decrease was offset 
by a tendency from donors in investing instead in proj-
ect-based initiatives.
Although pooled funds rarely dominate the aid flows 
at the country level, they assume a catalytic role that 
makes them of high importance, since the mechanisms 
and processes associated with pooled funds often trigger 
collaboration among donors and with governments. 
Examples of such collaboration include pooled funds 
implemented in Liberia, Central African Republic, Ethi-
opia, Nepal and Southern Sudan6
Recently, much has been written about this aid modality, 
and yet clear evidence on the performance and effective-
ness of these funds is still relatively scarce. The 2011 World 
Development Report indicates that the ‘performance of 
multi-donor trust funds is mixed, with criticisms ranging 
from slowness to a lack of expectation management and 
mixed in working through national systems’. Similarly, 
a recent review from Barakat shows a mixed picture 
regarding the ability of pooled funds according to the 
principles of the Paris Declaration, pointing towards the 
need of generating further evidence on this aid modality.1
Furthermore, Coppin highlights that there is a paucity 
of comparable data on pooled funds’ performance 
limiting the ability of donors, recipients and imple-
menters to transparently assess the effectiveness of this 
mechanism in enhancing aid effectiveness.8 Most impor-
tantly, there is no agreed framework or tool which can be 
used to assess the pooled funds.9
This paper intends to contribute to filling the research 
gap on this aid modality through the assessment of the 
Health Transition Fund (HTF) in Zimbabwe, a multi-
donor pooled fund implemented from 2012 to 2015 
countrywide to support the health sector. Measuring the 
effectiveness and the contributions of pooled funding to 
aid in fragile settings is essential, given the evidence that 
donors are reverting to project-based initiatives instead, 
at least for MNCH. Although pooled funds are not the 
golden standard in terms of aid harmonisation and 
alignment, they are a key intermediate measure in such 
direction—at least in fragile settings—to overcome the 
incoherence observed in ODA between the Paris Princi-
ples and the actual current practice of fragmentation and 
verticalisation of many development initiatives.10
The paper begins by describing the study setting to 
present the context of the study. It then describes the 
conceptual framework (Coppin’s framework) and the 
methods used for this assessment. This is followed by the 
results section which presents the assessment of HTF in 
Zimbabwe using the proposed conceptual framework. 
The paper concludes with a discussion of the framework 
relating to the results of HTF and pooled funds else-
where, its limitations and potential applicability.8
study setting
In Zimbabwe, the health system was severely weakened by 
a political and economic crisis that affected the country 
between 2000 and 2008. Such crisis resulted in a near 
collapse of the economy, that in turn caused a humani-
tarian crisis and massive migration to neighbouring coun-
tries. The impact of this crisis was further exacerbated by 
the severe HIV/AIDS epidemic that hit the country during 
the same period. Life expectancy dropped, and maternal 
and child mortality increased because of reduced access 
to goods and services.
In this social, economic and political context, the HTF 
was designed as a multi-donor pooled fund aiming to 
support the government in inverting trends in maternal 
and child health for all Zimbabweans.11 The Fund was 
implemented from January 2012 to December 2015, with 
an allocated investment of US$235 million. Department 
for International Development (DFID), the European 
Union, the Governments of Ireland, Sweden, Norway 
and Canada were the major contributors to the fund. 
Unicef was the fund manager. The initiative was designed 
to target the entire country. The main purpose of the 
Fund was to improve maternal, newborn and child health 
(MNCH) by strengthening the health system and scaling 
up the implementation of high-impact interventions for 
MNCH and nutrition. To achieve this goal, the funding 
mechanism was designed to support critical interventions 
such as: retention allowances to support the health work-
force (nurses and doctors) in rural areas; procurement of 
medicines, vaccines and commodities for maternal and 
child health; introduction of a results-based financing 
(RBF) mechanism in 42 of the 60 districts of Zimbabwe to 
support the operations of facilities at secondary level and 
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below and support to community-based interventions at 
scale.
Methodology
Conceptual framework
This paper has adapted Coppin’s framework to assess the 
pooled fund, HTF.8 For each of the Paris Principles of Aid 
effectiveness, Coppin identifies a range of indicators that 
are designed to capture the fit of the pooled fund under 
analysis with each of the five principles as below.
Ownership
A good pooled fund promotes ownership by aligning itself 
with the national strategies and plans and by engaging 
key players at the national level to ensure that local 
capacity and systems are strengthened. Four dimensions 
of ownership were explored in this study: the relationship 
of the fund with the government strategy; the representa-
tion of the government on fund committees; ministerial 
accountability for expenditure to the legislature and the 
location of the pooled fund financial management.
Alignment
The principle of alignment claims for development aid to 
invest as much as possible on country systems, so to build 
the capacity of national governments. The framework 
used in this study explores multiple indicators to assess 
alignment (table 1). They can be grouped in five major 
conceptual categories: the extent to which the fund is ‘on 
budget’; the flexibility of the fund; the alignment of the 
fund management to country systems and procedures; the 
existence of salary top-up mechanisms and transparency.
Harmonisation
The principle of harmonisation concerns with coor-
dinated, transparent and collectively effective donor 
support. Three key dimensions of harmonisation were 
assessed: the interfacing of the fund with the wide group 
of donors; the experience and competence of the fund 
administrator and the existence of protocols for misuse 
of funds.
Delivery for results
The principle ‘delivery for results’ considers the ability 
of aid to produce outputs and to contribute to outcomes. 
The analysis reviews four dimensions of delivery for 
results: the fulfilment of financing commitments; the 
ability of the fund to spend allocated resources; the 
flexibility of the fund in reallocating resources and the 
requirement of counterpart funding.
Mutual accountability
To sustain mutual accountability, a good pooled fund 
mechanism is expected to set in place, transparent moni-
toring mechanisms, ideally built on national systems, as 
well as timely and regular reporting and independent 
evaluations. 
Online supplementary table 1 presents the indicators 
proposed by Coppin for each of the principles; each indi-
cator is assigned a score ranging from 0 to 1. Two inde-
pendent reviewers (who did not directly involve with the 
design and implementation of the fund) were selected on 
the basis of their knowledge of the pooled fund design 
and features. The reviewers scored each of the indicators, 
using primary and secondary data available via HTF eval-
uation. Any discrepancy in scoring was solved by discus-
sions among reviewers to reach consensus. A summary 
score was then calculated per each of the principles, 
using unweighted averages of all the indicators calculated 
for each principle. For each principle, the score ranges 
from 0% to 100%.
Methods
This study used a mixed-methods approach to evaluate 
the HTF against the Coppin’s framework.
Qualitative data
Primary qualitative evidence was collected through the 
HTF evaluation, using key informant interviews (KIIs) 
and focus group discussions (FGDs). Purposive sampling 
was used to identify and recruit potential participants for 
FGDs and KIIs. The evaluation conducted a total of 30 
KIIs with national level policy-makers (n=5), members of 
district health executives (n=15), managers and health-
care providers from health facilities (n=13) within the 
districts of Matabeleland South, Mashonaland East and 
Masvingo provinces. The provinces and districts were 
chosen due to the difference in socioeconomic and 
health characteristics; in particular, the selection criteria 
included: geographical coverage of the country; different 
levels of health indicators across provinces and poverty 
levels were used to stratify and select districts. We also 
interviewed national level informants (n=7) from multi-
lateral and bilateral organisations. A total of 20 FGDs 
were also conducted, comprising 124 community men 
and women and 73 volunteer health workers (VHWs). 
For interviews, questions were focused on effectiveness, 
relevance, efficiency and sustainability of the pooled 
fund. For FGDs, questions were focused on the MNCH 
situation and use of MNCH health services, experience 
in accessing those services and barriers and enablers to 
use services. All transcribed FGD and KII material were 
analysed thematically guided by the Coppin’s framework. 
The analysis was guided by a qualitative content analysis 
of Graneheim and Lundman which focuses on the key 
areas of consensus and disagreement,12 and where rele-
vant, triangulating KIIs with FGDs.
secondary data analysis
We also used available reports and data sets that were rele-
vant to both the Zimbabwe health system and the HTF. 
Routine data from HMIS were obtained via the Ministry 
of Health and Child Care (MoHCC). Other reports 
were either accessed through development partners 
in Zimbabwe or via literature search conducted by the 
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Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine team. The main 
secondary data sources used are included in the online 
supplementary table 2.
ethics
Participation in the study was voluntary, and no incentives 
were given to participants. In line with the consent agree-
ment, data for this study are not publicly available, and 
anonymity of study participants was maintained during 
data collection, data management and analysis.
Patient and public involvement
Patients were not involved in the design of this study.
results
The results of the evaluation are presented against the 
Coppin’s principles and using the conceptual framework 
adapted for this study. Table 1 presents the final score 
Table 1 Summary score of the key principles of the conceptual framework
Principle Indicator Scoring of HTF Zimbabwe
Ownership Pooled fund relationship to relevant government strategy 1
National government is represented on committees 1
Ministerial accountability for expenditure to legislature 0.5
Location of pooled fund financial management in ministry 0
63%
Alignment CABRI on budget indicators
… on plan 0.5
… on budget 0.5
… on treasury 0
… on parliament 0
… on procurement 0
… on accounting 0
… on audit n/a
… on report 1
Low proportion of funds that can be earmarked 1
Flexibility of technical assistance to work beyond pooled fund 1
Business conducted in national currency 1
Business conducted in sync with the national financial year 1
Business conducted using national budget classifications 0
Salary top-ups go beyond management unit staff 1
Pooled fund documentation and reports made publicly available 1
Project preparation and approval guidelines available 0
53%
Harmonisation Regular interface with wide group of donors 1
Experience and competence of fund administrator 1
Protocol for misuse of funds includes national accountability processes 0.5
83%
Delivery of 
results
Financing: commitments to projects/financing received 0.54
Financing: actual spending/planned spending 0.88
Flexibility to reallocate funds to different priorities within year 1
No requirement of counterpart funding 1
86%
Mutual 
accountability
Monitoring of pooled fund includes government processes 0.5
Timeliness of pooled fund reports 1
Independent (not joint) reviews 1
84%
CABRI, Collaborative Africa Budget Reform Initiative; HTF, Health Transition Fund.
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of the HTF against the five principles, as per indicators 
adapted from the proposed conceptual framework.
ownership
A review of national documents, complemented by KIIs, 
strongly suggests that the HTF was fully aligned with 
national policies and strategies as it was fully designed 
and implemented in line with the objectives and key 
priorities of the Zimbabwe National Health Strategy 
2009–2013. It was also informed by the Maternal and 
Neonatal Roadmap 2007–2015 and by the National Child 
Survival Strategy 2010–2015.
The government was highly represented on commit-
tees, thanks for a well-defined management and gover-
nance structure (figure 1). The pillar of this structure was 
a steering committee, appointed as the core body over-
seeing the governance and decision-making processes of 
HTF. A fund manager (Unicef) was tasked to ensure the 
implementation on time and within the budget of all the 
initiatives approved by the steering committee. Day-to-day 
activities were overseen and coordinated by an HTF 
Secretariat, hosted by MoHCC. The steering committee 
was composed of the MOHCC and representatives from 
the civil society and multilateral and bilateral organisa-
tions. A review of available records showed that steering 
committee meetings included on average 50 invitees. It 
was chaired by the MoHCC, in the person of the perma-
nent secretary and co-chaired by an HTF donor. Evidence 
from KIIs confirms a highly participatory approach of the 
committee (box 1, quote 1). Most interview respondents 
reported that by engaging a diverse range of stakeholders 
and high-level policy-makers, the Fund promoted owner-
ship and leadership role of the MoHCC in the design 
and implementation of activities. Respondents believed 
that the structure of HTF governance was inclusive as it 
allowed key health system players to participate in plan-
ning and implementation. This promoted accountability 
and transparency (box 1, quote 2). Of note, some respon-
dents perceived that the steering committee was too big 
to be effective in decision making and hence, having 
subcommittees would have been more effective.
Regarding financial accountability, data confirmed that 
the HTF was referred to in the annual budget statements 
of Zimbabwe on a yearly basis. Yet, the Government was 
not formally accountable for reporting the HTF expen-
diture to the Parliament. More importantly, all finan-
cial transactions were accounted for by the Unicef. The 
fund manager bore the financial risk of managing the 
Figure 1 Governance and management structure of the HTF. HTF, Health Transition Fund; LSTM, Liverpool School of Tropical 
Medicine; MoHCC, Ministry of Health and Child Care; RBF, results-based financing; VHMASS, Vital   Medicines Availability and 
Health Services Survey. 
box 1 ownership
1. "…there has been a lot of transparency, people know exactly 
who is bringing what and what it’s being used for and therefore I 
wouldn’t change anything in terms of the governance structure. I 
think that has worked very, very well and it also has brought confi-
dence …in the whole HTF mechanism. Because everybody knows 
what is happening.” (A national level respondent from a multilateral 
organisation)
2.  “I like the way that we engage very closely with the government, for 
ownership and capacity building. I like the way that was very trans-
parent with donors…. it is a very transparent way of dealing with 
things and it makes it very easy to manage these funds because 
any decision that needs to be taken is escalated to the steering 
committee then we are clear.” (A national level respondent from a 
multilateral organisation)
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Fund on behalf of the donors and used its own financial 
systems rather than government systems to account for 
the expenses incurred by the Fund.
Therefore, HTF Zimbabwe scored 63% with regard to 
the ownership principle (table 1).
Alignment
The Collaborative Africa Budget Reform Initiative 
criteria were used to assess whether HTF was ‘on budget’. 
The HTF relied on a thorough process of annual plan-
ning, well integrated with national structures and meet-
ings which were approved by the steering committee. 
However, as Unicef managed the fund, national systems 
of budgeting, reporting, accounting and auditing were 
not used for the fund management. The procurement 
and supply management implementation arrangements 
entailed a single-source procurement modality via the 
Unicef Supply Division. Unicef directly delivered procure-
ment items to the National Pharmaceutical Company 
(NatPharm) warehouses, and the NatPharm was respon-
sible for distribution under financial support of the HTF. 
The HTF procurement system presented a high level of 
efficiency and fulfilled all the requirements expressed in 
annual MoHCC procurement plans at competitive price 
values. Yet, it relied on a parallel supply mechanism, and 
it did not invest in addressing the structural weaknesses of 
the national procurement system (box 2, quote 1). The 
assessment provides a picture of the HTF being largely an 
‘off budget’ funding mechanism.
Regarding flexibility of funds, a clear process was in 
place, whereby annual work plans and budgets were 
planned and approved by the steering committee. Mech-
anisms and processes allowed for continuous review of 
activities and related expenditure and guaranteed flex-
ibility in managing the funds as per emerging needs 
and priorities (box 2, quote 2). The fund also provided 
flexibility in using HTF funded technical assistance for 
broader purposes than the fund oversight only.
Regarding the fund alignment with systems, the review 
of HTF records and reports confirmed that the business 
was entirely conducted using the national currency and 
synchronising with national financial years. However, the 
national budget classification was not used as the fund 
was managed outside of the MoHCC.
Salary top-up mechanisms was a rather central compo-
nent of the fund. The fund supported retention and crit-
ical postallowances at the national, provincial, district 
and facility levels. According to 2015 HR staffing data, 
the scheme had contributed to reducing the vacancy rate 
since the implementation of the retention scheme in 
2009. The overall vacancy rate for the key health profes-
sional cadres had fallen from 42% in 2009 to 30% in 2015; 
the number of doctors increased by 346 over the period, 
and vacancy rates for the nursing cadres fell by half from 
14% in 2009 to 7% in 2015.
Despite those achievements, health workers perceived 
the scheme to be divisive causing conflict and resentment 
in some facilities as the rationale for who was benefiting 
was not always clearly understood. One of the common 
complaints over the years was the issue of the untime-
liness and unpredictability of disbursements leading 
to confusion and frustration of the lengthy payment 
processes. Respondents also expressed dissatisfaction with 
the declining amount of the incentives and reduction in 
the allowances over the years, especially when there has 
not been a corresponding increase in government. Some 
indicated that nurses and midwives were staying in their 
jobs only because they had no other alternative nor did 
not have sufficient resources to leave. Strong mechanisms 
were found to be in place to ensure transparency. Project 
documentation including the initial proposal, annual 
reports, monitoring reports and thematic briefs were 
available and widely disseminated in the country.
The assessment of the alignment principle presents a 
total score of 50% (table 1).
harmonisation
In Zimbabwe, in 2015 official development assistance 
accounted for more than 50% of the overall annual enve-
lope for the health sector, and the HTF alone accounted 
for approximately 7% of that envelope. Other major 
donors to health included United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID), the Global Fund, 
the World Bank and the Global Alliance for Vaccine and 
Immunization (GAVI). Document review and qualita-
tive data showed that the HTF was designed and imple-
mented to complement and support other donors’ 
initiatives rather than duplicating efforts (box 3, quote 
1). As an example, the RBF mechanism was scaled up 
via HTF, drawing on the model piloted with World Bank 
funding. Also, the health retention scheme supported via 
the HTF complemented and progressively absorbed the 
support provided to healthcare workers with Global Fund 
resources.
More importantly, the HTF Steering Committee formed 
a platform where non-HTF donors could participate, 
box 2 Alignment
1. “You also need to start building the capacity of NatPharm to take 
over the role that these agencies are doing, in procuring and dis-
tribution. In terms of capacity building in terms of distribution has 
been put in place. But mainly for example the procurement aspect 
of it. Not a lot has been done… even in the distribution making sure 
that the systems are functioning properly. Capacitating NatPharm 
to be able to do it independently. That hasn’t been done. Everybody 
talks about capitalise NatPharm…but they don’t have the capacity 
to procure, they don’t have the capacity to distribute.” (A national 
level respondent from a multilateral organisation)
2. “…the program is being implemented to large extent through the 
Ministry of Health structure. The coordination is also led by the 
Ministry, the PS is the chair of the steering committee as donors 
chair with him. So, it has been flexible…just great flexibility….so 
that flexibility also I think has helped it be what it is as compared to 
other processes that are sort of rigid and…we can’t change any-
thing.” (A national level respondent from a multilateral organisation)
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which offered a unique opportunity for all partners to 
discuss policies and to ensure coordination between the 
various funding initiatives designed and implemented in 
Zimbabwe (box 3, quote 2).
Regarding experience and competence of the Fund 
Manager, the results of interviews and document review 
demonstrated that Unicef presented a unique and advan-
tageous blend of consolidated and efficient fund manage-
ment expertise and of technical capacity in assisting the 
MoHCC in designing and implementing health strategies. 
In addition to fulfilling the function of the fund manager, 
Unicef also played an active role in providing technical 
assistance to the MoHCC and in directly implementing 
some of the HTF activities (eg, procurement).
Regarding protocols for misuse of funds, this compo-
nent largely relied on the internal financial and quality 
assurance mechanisms and procedures of Unicef.
The HTF scored 83% for the principle ‘harmonisation’ 
(table 1).
delivery for results
The initial HTF proposal document presented an overall 
budget estimate of US$435 million. A total of US$235 
million were allocated by donors, corresponding to 54% 
of the initial estimates. Of those, US$207 million (88%) 
were used. Overall, financial use analysis indicates a good 
degree of flexibility from the HTF in adjusting the distri-
bution of planned allocation to needs emerging during 
implementation, oriented by the Steering Committee. 
Both in FY 2014 and 2015, the budget forecasts were 
readjusted to allocate additional resources to thematic 
area 3 by reallocating resources from other budget lines 
as shown in figure 2. Many central level stakeholders who 
participated in the interviews perceived flexibility as a key 
asset of the HTF. Finally, the fund had no requirement of 
counterpart cofunding.
The assessment highlighted that HTF was a well-estab-
lished mechanism that supported the achievement of 
documented results in Zimbabwe throughout its imple-
mentation. The HTF log–frame analysis highlighted 
that 96% of the HTF output level indicators had shown 
progress during the implementation period (table 2). 
This suggests that the Fund strategies and management 
arrangements were successful in achieving the intended 
results of the initiative. As a result, the availability and 
readiness of MNCH services at primary and secondary 
box 3 harmonisation
1. “For me the legacy of HTF is with good corporate governance, if 
there is good corporate governance UNICEF coordinating and re-
sources are there, and if resources are channelled in a way which 
is holistic which covers everything.” (A national level respondent 
from the MOHCC)
2.  “…I think there was also improved coordination at national level 
by bringing these funding mechanisms together in one basket. That 
was one thing that was a very huge positive in terms of focusing 
resources on the priority area. For me that was the driving forces 
of the success of that program.” (A national level respondent from 
the MOHCC)
Figure 2 HTF expenditure versus allocated budget, cumulative 2012–2015 (in US$).
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level was largely restored across the country due to a mix 
of interventions including the provision of equipment 
and supplies, availability of trained and qualified staff, 
RBF, improved planning and supervision. Despite those 
achievements, HTF had challenges in achieving results in 
some of its supported programmes. This included resto-
ration of services at the community level (box 4, quote 1)
and the health workers’ retention schemes (box 4, quotes 
2, 3).
In summary, regarding the principle ‘delivery for 
results’, HTF scored 86% (table 1).
Mutual accountability
Regarding monitoring, a complex logical framework was 
set in place since the inception of the HTF, with indica-
tors at output, outcome and impact level defined. The 
log–frame entailed tracking a baseline value and then 
annual progress against a final target. The assessment 
highlighted some design gaps in the monitoring frame-
work due to lack of specifications in the sources of infor-
mation, definition of indicators and frequency of data 
collection.
Also, many indicators relied primarily on popula-
tion-based surveys or on facility assessments. For instance, 
the Vital Medicines Availability and Health Services 
Survey was essential for the HTF to monitor performance. 
The mechanism was managed directly by Unicef with data 
collection and analysis subcontracted to a local agent. 
Ultimately, only a handful of all the indicators identified 
by the HTF to monitor performance relied on routine 
Health Management Information Systems (HMIS) data. 
This approach to monitoring generated continuous 
demand for ad hoc surveys, instead of stimulating invest-
ment in the quality and use of routine information and 
data.
Reporting was solid and regular as Unicef produced 
annual activity reports and shared it with the Steering 
Committee and donors. The HTF had an independent 
Table 2 Average annual rate of change for tracer HTF outcome indicators
Interventions 
along the 
continuum of care Tracer indicators
Pre-HTF Baseline Endline AAR 2005/2006–2010/2011 AAR 2010/2011–2015
DHS 2005/6 (%)
DHS 
2010/11 (%)
DHS 2015 key 
findings (%) (%) (%)
Maternal and 
newborn health
Antenatal care 
visits (4+)
71 64.8 75.7 −1.3 3.1
Skilled attendance 
at delivery
68.50 66.20 78.1 −0.5 2.4
Postnatal care 
visits
30.30 27.1 51.1 −0.6 4.8
Immunisation 
coverage
Full immunisation 
(12–23 months)
52.60 55.60 73 0.6 3.5
Infant and young 
child nutrition
Exclusive 
breastfeeding 
0–5 months
22.20 31.40 47.8 1.8 3.3
Vitamin A 
supplementation
47.10 65.60 32.3* 3.7 −8.3
Care seeking 
and access to 
treatment for sick 
children
Diarrhoea 
treatment (ORS or 
RHF)
61.6 63.30 72.5* 0.3 2.3
Children with 
pneumonia treated 
with antibiotics
7.9 31 34.3* 4.6 0.8
*From MICS 2014 as these indicators were not available in DHS Key Findings 2015.
AAR, Average annual rate; DHS, Demographic Health Survey; HTF, Health Transition Fund; MICS, Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey;  ORS, 
Oral rehydration salts; RHF, recommended homemade fluids.
box 4 delivery for results
1. “As Village Workers, we should be equipped with kits to assist peo-
ple (…). We also need improvement in communication. What I mean 
is that, we do not afford to communicate by mobile because of lack 
of financial resources. We expect some allowances.” (A community 
health worker, FGD)
2. “The divide and rule policy the Ministry of Health has is very danger-
ous. Someone working in labour ward gets an allowance, someone 
has got midwifery and working in outpatient is not getting it, but 
now when they happen to have a problem in maternity, which they 
know I can assist them, if they call me I don’t go, because I am not 
getting an allowance.” (A health worker from a district hospital)
3. “You sometimes go for long periods without anything and then when 
it comes you are not sure whether you have received what you are 
supposed to be receiving because it comes as a lump sum. Like 
now I see something on my phone that money is coming but I am 
not sure where it is coming from.” (A health worker from a district 
hospital)
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evaluation embedded in its design. The evaluator, Liver-
pool School of Tropical Medicine, was selected via a 
competitive bidding process and contracted by Unicef. 
The final evaluation report is publicly available on the 
Unicef global evaluation database.
The HTF scored 86% with regard to mutual account-
ability (table 1).
dIsCussIon
Evidence and analysis of pooled funds are abundantly 
available via reviews and evaluations performed in various 
contexts.13–17 Yet, pooled funds are still an emerging 
mechanism,18 and the peer-reviewed literature on this 
aid modality and on its effectiveness is still insufficient. 
A common framework for analysis of pooled funds is 
lacking.
Based on a framework proposed by Coppin, this paper 
provides an assessment of the performance of the HTF 
during its implementation in Zimbabwe, from 2012 to 
2015, evaluating the pooled fund against the Paris Princi-
ples of aid effectiveness (figure 3).8 This pooled fund was 
an optimal option to channel external aid to the health 
sector in Zimbabwe during a period of social, political 
and economic crisis. There is evidence that: the HTF 
worked well; it produced results at scale and quickly; it 
enhanced coordination and ownership at national and 
subnational level. However, and to some extent, the initia-
tive did not always succeed in strengthening local capacity 
and systems. In fact, if on one hand the HTF investment 
in human resources for health was critical for creating 
long-term capacity, on the other hand for other inter-
ventions such as RBF or procurement, long-term condi-
tions were not created during the life of the programme. 
This is understandable, given the situation in Zimbabwe 
at the time of its implementation, where the focus was 
on restoring essential services within a nearly collapsed 
system rather than on building long-term capacity.
Ownership emerges as a key feature of the HTF. Our 
assessment provides substantial evidence of a high degree 
of ownership of the HTF at all levels of the health system, 
although the fund was not fully administered via national 
systems. Barakat documents that in many cases govern-
mental involvement in pooled funds is virtual or minimal 
and that donors control the real decision-making 
process.19 To the contrary, the HTF showed an effective 
partnership and coordination mechanism within the 
health sector in Zimbabwe and strengthened corporate 
governance through the steering committee, where 
donors and the MoHCC met regularly, ensuring owner-
ship and leadership. Also, the HTF proved to be a clear 
and well-understood mechanism throughout the health 
system; it enhanced planning at the district level and rein-
forced accountability systems at the facility level. This is 
in line with findings from Scanteam, which documents 
that the pooled fund is an important vehicle in terms of 
coordination and harmonisation.20
Regarding alignment, HTF presented mixed results. 
As reported by Graham, most pooled funds fall into the 
category of earmarked funds.21 Funding allocated to 
HTF was not earmarked by donors, although bound to 
annual work plans and budgets approved by the Steering 
Committee. Positive features of the HTF were the flexi-
bility in using the funds for activities that were designed 
to fulfil government strategies and plans. Also, the HTF 
relied on annual plans of work and was not ‘projects 
based’ as other pooled funds are; this reduced ad hoc 
decision making and micromanagement and increased 
efficiency.14 22 Alignment with national systems was poor 
in comparison to other pooled funds.2 3 14 20 This was 
due to risk management considerations, during a period 
where systems were barely functional in Zimbabwe and 
where some donors had pulled out of the country for 
political reasons. Similar observation was reported by 
Martinez-Alvarez and colleagues9 that pooled funding 
was declined over their study period.9 Despite this weak-
ness, the investment in lower levels structures and mech-
anisms of accountability and governance sustained via 
HTF formed a solid platform to enhance the capacity of 
the system to fulfil its mandate at the frontline. This was 
not observed in other pooled funds.22
Harmonisation is the basis of the aid effectiveness 
pyramid; our assessment concludes that the HTF 
performed well regarding harmonisation.23 As reported by 
Salama et al, before HTF, there was no forum in Zimbabwe 
for systematic sectoral level engagement between donors, 
UN agencies and the Ministry of Health.15 Martinez-Al-
varez et al9 also presented fragmentation of funding at 
national level in their case study in Tanzania9 as a key 
barrier to harmonisation and hence to aid effectiveness. 
As well documented by Dijkstra, donors’ divergence in 
administrative requirements, and more importantly in 
political agenda, can be a strong barrier to harmonisation 
and hinder the effectiveness of aid initiatives. In the case 
of the HTF, the Steering Committee functioned as a cata-
lytic force, stimulating dialogue and coordination among 
HTF and non-HTF partners which proved to be useful in 
restoring the health sector in the country. Although other 
Figure 3 Summary score: performance of the Health 
Transition Fund.
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donors to Zimbabwe were not part of the HTF (World 
Bank; GAVI; Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis 
and Malaria (GFATM); USAID), there was a clear effort 
of streamlining high-level decisions under the Steering 
Committee. Progressively some of the key donors to the 
country were approached to join the HTF (eg, GAVI) or 
for technical coordination (eg, World Bank). Also, other 
UN technical agencies were involved in HTF-related tech-
nical dialogue. Prospectively, as the country embarked in 
the design of a second phase of the fund, the HDF, this 
approach helped to reduce transaction costs related to 
multiple and often parallel committees set up by various 
vertical initiatives or donors as observed in other pooled 
funds.14 In its review of transition funds as a model of 
innovative financing in various sectors in Zimbabwe, 
Salama et al identify accountability mechanisms as a key 
feature of the transition fund.15 The evaluation findings 
confirm this assessment. Whereas monitoring mecha-
nisms for other pooled funds in Zimbabwe were set for ad 
hoc donor measurement, in the case of the HTF, despite 
the limited use of HMIS data, the monitoring mechanism 
became central to measure progress for the entire health 
sector.22 Also, all reviews and evaluations were strongly 
owned by the Steering Committee and used for evidence-
based decisions.
As noted by Pearson,24 joint agreed strategies, expected 
results and goals between donors, government and imple-
menting agents are essential to ensure that aid has a strong 
focus on results. In that, delivery of results was central to 
the HTF design and implementation. Targets were estab-
lished at outcome and output levels that were aligned to 
and supportive of the national health strategy, and signifi-
cant changes in maternal, newborn and child health were 
observed during the HTF implementation in Zimbabwe. 
While the under-5 mortality rate was stagnant during the 
5 years preceding the HTF inception, data suggest that 
Zimbabwe inverted trends and reported significant reduc-
tion in child mortality since 2010, which decreased from 
84 deaths per 1000 live births in 2010/2011 to 69 deaths 
per 1000 live births in 2015. During the same period, 
maternal mortality decreased from 960 per 100 000 live 
births to 651 per 100 000 live births.25 26 Our assessment 
highlights that HTF was instrumental in supporting this 
improvement as a consistent progress in coverage of key 
Maternal, Newborn, Child Health & Nutrition (MNCHN) 
interventions along the continuum of care was observed 
during the period 2009–2015. This was mainly possible 
due to a streamlined approach to governance and fund 
management that catalysed resources against a clear and 
shared plan of action. Bigsten and Tegstam27 suggest 
that improved coordination has potentially strong effects 
on harmonisation, ownership and alignment of aid and 
as a result on aid effectiveness. On the contrary, Marti-
nez-Alavarez et al highlight that volatility of funding 
may affect the governments’ ability to plan and delivery 
for results.9 In Zimbabwe, while progress in achieving 
improved outcomes at country level cannot be attributed 
to HTF only, the findings of the evaluation consistently 
pointed towards the importance of the HTF in playing 
a central role of ensuring service delivery on one hand, 
and of aggregation, coordination, dialogue and decision 
making on the other, that benefited the entire health 
sector. In synthesis, the strong capacity of the HTF to 
deliver results was largely a function of good governance 
and coordination between donors, the fund management 
and the government and the capacity of donors to guar-
antee a predictable allocation of funds against set targets. 
Ball and Van Beijnum,5 in reviewing the experience of 
15 pooled funds in transition situation, argue that lead-
ership, coordination and participation of donors and 
government to the governance of pooled fund is essen-
tial to enhance effective fund management, and yet this 
is not often consistently achieved when designing and 
implementing pooled funds. In that, the HTF was instead 
a successful example.
At times where the political and administrative system 
was weak, the Fund served as an essential risk manage-
ment vehicle that permitted to channel donors’ resources 
to the health sector reducing risks and transaction costs 
and permitting an effective delivery of results across 
various pillars of the health system. Commins et al argue 
that a critical trade-off embedded in the logic and design 
of pooled funds is that between the speed of service 
delivery and fiduciary risk versus capacity development 
and building of government systems.6 In fact, the strong 
focus of the HTF on delivering for results led to polit-
ical and programmatic choices of investing in quick-win 
strategies and approaches aimed to yield returns in the 
short term. Consequently, the investment in local capacity 
and systems was not sufficient to ensure sustainability. A 
transition towards full implementation capacity from the 
Government lacked during the implementation phase.
limitations of the study
This study has used qualitative methods complemented 
by document review to assess a pooled fund mechanism in 
Zimbabwe. Besides, we have used purposive sampling of 
specific groups of participants who were familiar with the 
pooled fund mechanisms and procedures in Zimbabwe. 
Hence, the results of this study may have limited general-
isability beyond its immediate study sites as it included a 
limited number of stakeholders at a specific point in time. 
The content analysis guided by the conceptual framework 
impose an informed bias to the study.28 However, during 
analysis, we employed both inductive and deductive 
(within the predetermined themes) coding. The trust-
worthiness of the findings was ensured by the collective 
experience of the authors complemented by triangu-
lating the information from secondary sources.
There is no universally agreed or recommended frame-
work to assess pooled funds in place.9 However, we adapted 
Coppin’s (2012) framework to assess HTF in Zimbabwe.7 8 
We conclude that the tool will require fine tuning before 
wider use; as an example, none of the indicators for the 
principle of delivery of results provide an assessment of 
whether the pooled fund produced its intended results 
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or not. The guidance to score each of the 30 proposed 
indicators and to produce summary scores need further 
refinement as well. In applying the scoring to the HTF, 
the authors agreed on an adapted approach to produce a 
score in those cases where the answer was not necessarily 
a yes or no (0; 1).
Furthermore, the framework proposed by Coppin 
has not been widely implemented with lack of available 
benchmarks to qualify the scoring against agreed criteria 
or golden standards. This limits the credibility and reli-
ability of the framework, particularly due to the absence of 
clear guidance on how to measure each of the indicators. 
Each principle from the Coppin’s framework originates 
from the broad Paris Principles for Aid Effectiveness.2 3 9 
Transforming this multidimensional Paris Principles into 
quantifiable indicators do not allow for a robust assess-
ment. Similarly, Martinez-Alvarez et al9 suggested qualita-
tive assessment of some of the principles.9 Additionally, 
the ability of the indicators of the tool ‘as is’ to capture 
the dimensions that they are aimed to measure is limited. 
For instance, under the principle ‘Delivery for result’, 
there is no indicator in Coppin’s framework attempting 
to capture the capacity of the Fund to achieve results 
against initial targets or plans.
Implications for policy and practice
This paper provides a methodological contribution to 
development literature through (1) adapting one of 
the well-known aid effectiveness frameworks to assess a 
pooled fund mechanism and (2) assessing a pooled fund 
mechanism in a fragile context, Zimbabwe. At the end of 
the HTF, an extension of it, named the HDF, was designed 
and launched in Zimbabwe, following the same logic 
of the HTF and broadening its scope of work to more 
programmatic areas. This confirms some key conclusions 
regarding the HTF: first, that it was a win–win solution 
for both the government and donors, which therefore 
decided to replicate it; second, that the risk of investing 
directly in the government was still too high for donors at 
the end of the transition phase due to the uncertainty of 
the context and third, that the local systems and capacity 
were not yet at a stage where they could deliver some of 
the activities without the support of a fund manager.
Evaluating whether the model of the transition fund 
evolves during the development stage to addresses its 
weaknesses rather than doing more of the same will be 
central to conclude whether the modality adopted in 
various sectors in Zimbabwe via transition funds is eventu-
ally sustainable and effective.
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